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)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature of the Case
Appeal from the jury verdict, appeal from district court sitting in appellate capacity.
B. Procedural History

Appellant Wade Tomlinson, (hereafter "Tomlinson"), was charged with driving
under the influence, (hereafter "DUI"), in Citation# 1481950, entered a plea of"not guilty",
and the matter was set for jury trial. The jury trial was continued at Tomlinson's request on
two occasions. The state filed a MOTION IN LIMINE with the clerk of the court on March
4, 2013. The state did not request a hearing at the time said motion was filed. The state did
not ever file a request for hearing on the MOTION INN LIMINE. A TRIAL STATUS
MEMORANDUM was filed on November 19, 2012, ordering the state to prepare a formal
complaint for trial by "1 week prior". The formal complaint was filed on April 17, 2013- the
morning of the jury trial. The jury trial was held, at which time the jury returned a verdict of
"guilty". Tomlinson was sentenced, and a timely appeal was filed. The state filed a
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MOTION TO DISMISS

appeal,

defendant filed an OBJECTION, at which time the

state withdrew their MOTION TO DISMISS. The district court sitting in an appellate
capacity denied the appeal.

appeal and brief in support follows.

C. Statement of Facts
Boise City Police Officer David Frederick, (hereafter "Frederick"), seized
Tomlinson's vehicle at 10:45 PM, (Jury Trial transcript, (hereafter "Tr", p 77, 11 7-8), for
committing two infractions- touching the double yellow line while exiting from a parking
lot, and not utilizing the closest available lane when making a left hand turn. Tomlinson
performed the field sobriety tests, and was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving
under the influence. Tomlinson submitted two breath samples, (breath alcohol
concentration, hereafter "BAC"), at forty-four and forty-six minutes after the time of the
stop, (Tr p 78, 11 1-7). Tomlinson had not been driving for approximately forty-five minutes
prior to submitting the two samples, (Tr p 78, 11 7-10). At the time of the seizure, (when
Tomlinson was last driving at 10:45 PM), he was traveling to his residence in Meridian,
Idaho, approximately ten miles from the location of the seizure, (Tr p 123, 111-2, see also
Defendant's A, p 124, 114). The driving time from the location of the seizure to
Tomlinson's residence is about 15-20 minutes, (Tr p 122, 1122-25).

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Should Tomlinson' s request for a continuance been granted at the time
the state filed the formal COMPLAINT on the morning of jury trial?
2. Was Tomlinson denied due process oflaw by the Court's erroneous
rulings in matters of law and evidence?
III. ARGUMENT
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A. Tomlinson's request for a continuance should have been granted at the time the state
filed the formal COMPLAINT on the morning of jury trial.
Tomlinson was charged under 18-8004 by citation. The morning of jury trial, the
state filed a formal complaint that could be interpreted as an attempt to proceed "per se",
with the language stating, " ... with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, as shown by
analysis of blood, urine, or breath, ... ". Prior to jury trial, the state filed a MOTION IN
LIMINE requesting the following ruling from the Court, " ... and hereby moves this Court to
exclude any evidence or testimony, whether elicited by a defense of State witness, regarding
the measurement of the uncertainty or margin of error for the LifeLoc FC20 device or
regarding the rising of the Defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC)." The state's motion in
lirnine did not specifically request to exclude field sobriety tests or other evidence
concerning impairment. There was no written ORDER by the Court on the motion in
lirnine, the Judge made some rulings on the motion on the morning of and during the jury
trial. The state listed two issues specifically in the motion in limine- margin of error and
rising of blood alcohol content.
Tomlinson is entitled to notice as to evidence allowed and not allowed. Notice in
this context means actual rulings by the Court, not notice that the state would attempt to
unconstitutionally limit Tomlinson's right and ability to present evidence by means of
proceeding "per se". Tomlinson was precluded from presenting evidence through crossexamination about FSTs, BAC at the time of the seizure, and other issues of impairment not
listed in the state's motion in limine. Since there was no written order from the Court
addressing the state's specific requests in the motion, the Court went beyond the request in
the motion in limine and denied Tomlinson due process by excluding evidence of time
frames and impairment.
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Idaho Criminal Rule 45(c) addresses the filing of a notice for hearing:
Rule 45. Time
(c) For motion, affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte,
and notice of hearing thereof, shall be served not later than seven (7) days before the time specified for the
hearing unless a different period of time is fixed by rule or by order of the court. For cause shown such an
order may be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be
served with the motion and opposing affidavits must be served not less than one (1) day before the hearing
unless the court permits them to be served at a later time.

Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 3(d) allows the state to amend a pleading prior to the
state resting if the defendant is not prejudiced. In this case, Tomlinson was prejudiced by
the amendment the morning of trial. Tomlinson prepared for trial based on the citation
issued the night of the incident. The state did not actually file the COMPLAINT until the
morning of trial. Tomlinson did not have sufficient notice of the hearing on the morning of
trial. A MOTION IN LIMINE is defined as follows:
"What counsel refers to as a motion to suppress may be more properly
denominated, in this case, a motion in limine. While no statute or rule expressly
authorizes such a motion, this Court has recognized its existence and stated that it
"enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing it to the jury.... The court's
ruling on the motion enables counsel on both sides to make strategic decisions before trial
concerning the content and order of evidence to be presented." Davidson v. Beco

Corporation, 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733 P .2d 781. 784 (Ct.App.1986). modified on other
grounds."
The dispositive language here is, "The court's ruling on the motion enables
counsel on both sides to make strategic decisions before trial...", (emphasis added).
MCR 3(d) allows for a continuance in the Court's discretion. The state could and should
have noticed the Motion before the morning of jury trial, and filed the Complaint in a
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timely manner. 1 Tomlinson asked for a continuance, arguing," ... Judge,

I may be

heard then. We would argue we're entitled to notice on these motions. As far as the
Complaint that was just filed, we just received that. We've prepared for trial and
proceeded on the fact that is (sic) says DUI on the citation, which is all we were provided
with.", (Davidson, (supra), cited during the argument). "So Judge, we're going to object
to this being heard. We were not placed on proper notice of this Complaint, and we were
not placed on proper notice of this Motion in Limine, and the jury is on the way in. So if
the Court is going to hear this Motion in Limine, we're going to request a continuance."
The Court denied the request for continuance and proceeded to hearing/trial.
Tomlinson prepared for trial and was on notice that the charge was impairment
DUI up to and including the morning of trial. Unless and until the Court granted the
Motion in Limine, per se DUI was not an issue. A defendant should not have to guess or
speculate when preparing a defense for jury trial- and when preparing to argue a Motion
in Limine. An expert witness to testify for the defense concerning ascending/descending
BAC, absorption rates of alcohol, FSTs, et al, would cost a significant amount of money.
Unless/until the Motion in Limine is granted, a defendant should not have to spend
money on an expert witness. The case law is clear; the Court violated due process 2 by
hearing the Motion at all, and abused its discretion by not granting the requested
continuance.

1

Though not conceding an expert witness is necessary, had Tomlinson been afforded
proper notice that the state would be allowed to proceed on the per se theory, an expert
would have been utilized.
2 "Due process requires an opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an
impartial tribunal.", Miller v St Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr. 139 Idaho 825 (2004).
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Tomlinson reiterates and incorporates by reference all arguments in Issue 2 in
support of Issue 1 since evidentiary rulings by the Magistrate are applicable to both.

B. Tomlinson denied due process oflaw by the Court's erroneous rulings in matters oflaw
and evidence.
Tomlinson reiterates and incorporates by reference all arguments in Issue 1 in
support of Issue 2 since evidentiary rulings by the Magistrate are applicable to both.
The state argued, and the Court erroneously ruled that State v. Stutliff, 97 Idaho
523, 547 P.2d 1128 (Idaho 1976), stood for the proposition that Tomlinson was precluded
from presenting any evidence of margin of error on the LifeLoc, ascending descending
BAC, results of field sobriety tests, i.e., any evidence of impairment, (.Tr p 101, 116-25, p
102, 111-25, p 103, 111-22). The Court in this case utilized Stutliff and held that the state
did not have to extrapolate the BAC back to the time of the stop, (when the defendant
was last driving), and any evidence goes to weight instead of admissibility, (Tr p 102, 11
9-14). Evidence that goes to weight versus admissibility is relevant evidence, and
Tomlinson should have been able to present said evidence under the Court's own ruling. 3
The Court and the state misinterpreted and misapplied Stutliff. In that case, the district
ruled that the BAC was inadmissible because the state did not have a witness to
extrapolate the level back to the time of the stop:

"We hold that this statute does not require extrapolation back but establishes that
the percentage of blood alcohol as shown by chemical analysis relates back to the time of
the alleged offense for purposes of applying the statutory presumption. This holding is in

3

Idaho Rule of Evidence, ("IRE"), 401,402. See also Stutliff, at page 524, "The lapse of
time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results
and not to their admissibility." If evidence is relevant, the defendant has a due process
right to present said evidence to the jury. See also RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
footnote, (supra).
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accord
those
jurisdictions who have considered the question. Jackson v.
City of Roanoke, -"-~-~" .:.....:...c------==~.:::-=-:..c, 1970); see also State v. Kohlasch,
_c.__~-=-='--=--''--"-'----'- (1972).
contrary result could defeat the statute entirely
since an extrapolation, particularly to a period prior to defendant's 'peak' period, would
often be based solely on the defendant's own testimony as to the amount of alcohol
ingested, the period of time over which it was ingested and the time of the last
consumption of alcohol. Indeed, should the defendant feel that his blood alcohol level
was lower at the time of the alleged offense, the statute specifically provides for 'the
introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether or not
the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages.' LC. § 49-1102(b)4.
This section entitles either party to produce a witness capable of extrapolating the results
to a prior period of time. The burden, however, is on the party who seeks to introduce this
evidence." (Stuttliff, p 525).
~~-,1--C~-

Stutliff does not preclude a defendant from presenting evidence of BAC level at the
time of driving; it places the burden on the party seeking to prove the matter. Further, the
language, "We hold that this statute does not require extrapolation back but establishes
that the percentage of blood alcohol as shown by chemical analysis relates back to the
time of the alleged offense for purposes of applying the statutory presumption", Sutliff,
supra), is dispositive ohhis issue. A jury must consider all evidence that is admitted, and
the rules of evidence do not distinguish between evidence from a witness on direct or cross
examination. Idaho Rule of Evidence 401: "Relevant Evidence" means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Since the state has the burden of proof, the defendant need not put on any
evidence. A defendant is allowed to make his/her entire case through cross-examination of
the state's witnesses. The state elicited evidence of the BAC level, so the accuracy of the
level is placed at issue. The state placed evidence in front of the jury about performance
checks, LifeLoc maintenance, absorption in the body of alcohol, time frames between the
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cessation of driving and the time of the BAC test, et al. Tomlinson should have been
allowed to present evidence about all these issues

cross-examination. 4

In State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 867 P.2d 1006

App. 1994),

court held:
"A defendant charged with driving under the influence by proof of excessive
alcohol content is entitled to offer any competent evidence tending to impeach the results
of the evidentiary tests admitted against him. See State v. Clark, 7 86 Or. 33,593 P.2d
123, 128 (1979); State v. Gates, 7 Haw.App. 440, 777 P.2d 717, 720-21 (1989). Thus, a
defendant may introduce evidence of his blood alcohol content, or other direct or
circumstantial evidence, to show a disparity between such evidence and the results
produced by the chemical testing, so as to give rise to an inference that the prosecution's
test results were defective. See State v. Clark, 593 P.2d at 126-27; State v. Keller, 36
Wash.App. 110,672 P.2d 412 (1983)."
In this case, Tomlinson was precluded from introducing this evidence by the
Court's erroneous rulings.
In State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P .3d 436 (Idaho 2005), the court held:
" We hold today that a numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for
driving under the influence (as opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation
is laid to assure the validity of the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result
back to the time of the alleged offense."

A defendant is allowed to place the issue in front of the jury regardless of the
state's decision to proceed on a per se basis. The extrapolation in Robinett, (supra), can
be established by direct or cross-examination.
Frederick testified he was familiar with the evidentiary concept of
ascending/descending blood levels, (Tr p 97, 1-5). The state objected to this line of
questioning, the jury was sent out, and the parties argued the issue. The state argues that

4

IRE 611 (b Scope of cross-examination
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Fredrick is not competent to testify
was

ascending/descending BAC. Fredrick testified he

certified, a breath testing specialist,

addition to a certified operator), on the

LifeLoc, at least a hundred hours of training, six years of continuing education, DRE
training, (Tr p 87, 113-13), had administered hundreds of the tests, (Tr p 33, 1110-25), and
conducted approximately five hundred DUI investigations, (Tr p 28, 11 8-10). Tomlinson
was not allowed to attempt to lay the foundation for Fredrick's competency even after
Fredrick testified he was familiar with the ascending/descending BAC.
Ascending/descending BAC is covered in POST training, and Fredrick testified
knowledgeably for some three pages in the transcript about the pyloric valve and alcohol's
journey through the body, (Tr p 89-92).
The state cannot limit a defendant's ability to put on a defense by the manner in
which it decides to charge a crime- impairment versus per se. 5 The state objected to the
defendant eliciting testimony about FST's, (Tr p 80, 1121-23). Tomlinson correctly argued
that the state had "opened the door" to said testimony by the officer's testimony about the
investigation, that the BAC at the time of driving, (forty-five minutes prior to the blow), was
relevant, the defendant has a due process right to present a case, a relevant issue is whether
the reading was accurate, further relevance lies in the fact the purported BAC readings were

5

RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE: The constitutional right to present a
complete and meaningful defense is grounded in the 6th Amendment Compulsory Process
Clause or Confrontation Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment,
which includes the right to offer testimony of witnesses, to cross-examine, and to present
the defendant's version of the facts. The defendant argues that few rights are more
fundamental than that of a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine a witness, and
present evidence through cross-examination. Evidentiary rules cannot trump the right to
present a defense, Lunbery v Hornbeak, 605 F. 3d 754 (9 th Cir. 2010).
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close to the legal limit, (.083, .082), and there is an acknowledged margin of error in the
LifeLoc, (Tr p 81, 111-25, p 82, ll 1-15).
This Court need not look any further than the DUI statute and

DUI jury

instruction to decide this issue. Idaho Code 18-8004 at (l)(a) reads as follows: "It is
unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other
intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other
intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in
subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath,
to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon
a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.",
(emphasis the author's).
The jury instruction for DUI given in this case reads in pertinent part as follows:
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of Driving Under the Influence the state
must prove each of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

On or about September 26, 2012
in the state if Idaho
the defendant, Wade Tomlinson, drove
a motor vehicle
upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the
public
6. while having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more as shown by analysis of the
defendant's breath., (emphasis added).
The verbiage in the statute and jury instruction define the offense, it is a violation
of due process for Tomlinson not to be able to enter evidence challenging the elements of
the crime for which he is charged. An appellate court may not change the plain meaning
and verbiage in a statute by an unconstitutional interpretation of a statute.
The state utilized Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 153 Idaho 200,280 P.3d
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703 (Idaho 2012), ad nauseam in their district court brief for the proposition that a BAC
over the limit at

time of testing is dispositive of the issue. Elias was a civil case

concerning an administrative license suspension. The burden

proof is not beyond a

reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. If the holding in Elias could be construed to apply
to criminal prosecutions- which it cannot, then it needs to be overturned in the criminal
context. Elias holds that, "There is no constitutional right to drive with alcohol in one's
system." Tomlinson argues that there are statutes setting what this alcohol limit is- .08 or
higher. "In essence, we held that the driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol
in his blood at the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was actually
driving an hour earlier." This holding applied in a criminal action defies law and logicthe statute is clear and unequivocal that the relevant BAC is while driving. The "took the
risk" language in a criminal context is fallacious, a citizen is either in violation of the law
or he is not, and due process requires notice of what said violation of the law is. In a
criminal case, the state has the burden of proof, unlike in Elias when said burden was on
the petitioner.
Further, the requirements in a civil hearing under IC 18-8002A(7) are inadequate
when considered in the light of due process protections in a criminal DUI case: 1- the
burden of proof is on the party requesting the administrative hearing; 2- the standard is
preponderance of the evidence versus beyond a reasonable doubt; 3- the finds of facts and
"law" by the hearing officer are, "independent of the determination of the same or similar
facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence; 4the losing party can seek judicial review in the manner provided for judicial review of
final agency actions." Id.
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Overly simplified
"per se"

dispositive of the issue

state opting to prosecute under

of DUI is the fundamental right to procedural due process oflaw.

defendant charged by the state has the absolute right to

relevant evidence at jury

trial. Once again, relevant evidence can be from a defense expert, or by way of crossexamination of state's witnesses. As long as the proposed evidence has any tendency to
make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Tomlinson's BAC at the time he ceased driving is this type of
evidence. Any and all evidence concerning BAC at the time of the seizure,
ascending/descending BAC, margin of error on the breathalyzer, performance on FSTs, et
al, should have been allowed to be presented to the jury in a full and complete manner.
The chief example of Tomlinson being precluded from eliciting relevant evidence
due to erroneous rulings by the Court is seen when the Court sustained the state's
objection to cross-examination evidence about the extent of the defendant's impairment,
results of FST's, (Tr p 856, 1112-25, p 86, 111-7).
The state entered the BAC printout into evidence over Tomlinson's objection, (Tr p
61, 111-25). Tomlinson objected as the BAC is a police report prohibited under IRE
803(6)(A), the state responded the report was allowed in under the statute. The Judge
erroneously ruled that the printout came in. The rule and statute are in conflict, when a
conflict exists between a rule and statute, the rule controls, (Tr p 61, 11 18-24) The jury
should not have had the BAC readout in the jury room ..

IV. CONCLUSION
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be vacated, and

case remanded for

a new trial. The defendant should receive his due process right to be heard on the issue of
per se

prosecution, and be allowed to present a complete and meaningful defense.

----
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